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Post-Harvest Grain Storing
and Hedging with Efficient Futures
Terry L. Kastens and Kevin C. Dhuyvetter
This study simulates  whether  Kansas wheat,  soybean,  corn,  and milo producers
could  have  profitably  used  deferred  futures  plus  historical  basis  cash  price
expectations  for post-harvest  unhedged and hedged  grain storage  decisions  from
1985-97.  The  signaled  storage  decision  is compared  to a representative  Kansas
producer whose crop sales mimic average  Kansas marketings each year. Using 23
grain price locations, the simulations resulted in an 11¢ per bushel annual increase
in grain storage profits for wheat, 27¢ for soybeans, - 17¢ for corn, and -20  for milo;
however, storage  profit differences varied substantially across locations.  Hedging
tended to decrease risk, but not impact profitability.
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Introduction
In  recent  years,  the  NCR-134  Conference  on  Applied  Commodity  Price  Analysis,
Forecasting,  and  Marketing  Risk Management  has  contained  a thread focusing  on
differences in research findings and extension teachings. Zulauf and Irwin report that
routine and systematic marketing strategies offer little hope for returns above simply
selling  at  harvest,  suggesting  decreased  extension  emphasis  on  grain  marketing
strategies. However, using 1964-89 data for Ohio corn, and following Working, they hint
that marketing gains may accrue  to producers  who use futures prices as a source of
information rather than as a trading medium.  Specifically,  using current basis and
deferred futures, along with expected future basis, they find projected returns to storage
are reasonable indicators of actual storage returns.
If Zulauf and Irwin are right, it makes sense for producers  to focus less on pre- or
post-harvest price picking and more on futures-based storage signals. However, if cash
markets are efficient,  positive economic returns to grain storage should not generally
prevail. Of course, market efficiency is likely to be observed only at sufficiently aggre-
gated levels and only from the perspective of average-cost participants.  Management
decisions, however,  are made at disaggregated levels by managers with widely varying
costs. Thus, although it is important to point out the fallacies of marketing strategies
that depend on futures inefficiency for profits, it could be valuable to develop strategies
that apply  to less  aggregated  prices  and producer-specific  costs, and  which assume
futures efficiency. At those levels, inefficient markets might be uncovered that could be
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exploited  for profit,  even  for  average-cost  producers. 1 Further,  explicitly  including
storage  costs in alternative  marketing strategies  should make them more useful for
producers, who must sell their crops at some point.
This research  is motivated  by repeated producer  questions  regarding appropriate
grain marketing strategies.  It  follows  up on Zulauf and Irwin's  suggestion  of using
futures and cash prices as indicators of storage returns, and is structured to develop
post-harvest grain marketing strategies that are useful to extension economists and
grain producers. The specific objectives of this analysis are (a) to test whether Kansas
wheat, corn, milo (grain sorghum),  and soybean producers  could have used deferred
futures plus historical  basis cash price  expectations  to profitably guide post-harvest
grain storage decisions over the last 13 years, and (b) to examine whether they would
have been better off yet, in terms of profit or risk, if grain storage were supplemented
with futures hedges. More  specifically,  would producers  who had used futures-based
grain storage signals have been more profitable than a representative producer whose
crop sales mimicked average Kansas marketings each year? And would simultaneously
implementing short futures hedges have improved the possibility of projected storage
returns bearing out? These questions are answered with a simulation of 1985-97 grain
storage returns covering multiple Kansas locations.
Background
Grain storage decisions depend intimately and intuitively on expected cash prices (e.g.,
Williams and Wright). Intuitively, if the present value of a future cash price less grain
holding costs is greater than current cash price, it is profitable to store grain. In partic-
ular, if the cash price expectation, taken at time t, for some future time period t + h, is
greater than the current cash price at time t plus interest and storage costs over time
h, then a profit-maximizing  grain producer  would  store  grain.  Conceptually,  grain
storage is viewed as an all-or-none decision:  either it pays to store or it does not. This
implies that producers would be expected to market a crop only once. However, Goodwin
and Kastens  found that Kansas  producers  market their crops more frequently  than
once, and suggested that fixed marketing costs, capital constraints, and risk are some
of the factors impacting marketing frequency.
Although the futures efficiency literature is large, with diverse procedural approaches
taken and diverse  conclusions, the evidence  generally favors efficiency-especially  for
grain futures. Further, there is little evidence that futures, and especially grain futures,
contain risk premia (Kolb 1992, 1996). Grain businesses regularly forward price based
on deferred futures, and futures prices are price expectations  (Eales et al.).  Futures
1 Economic profits  can be viewed as merely arbitrage  around long-run equilibria. In the Grossman  and Stiglitz  sense,
market efficiency cannot be rejected if expected  arbitrage returns are exceeded by costs  of acquiring the necessary infor-
mation. Yet, persistently low-cost (and thus high-profit)  producers might consider a market that yields positive economic
profits inefficient. Apparently, such producers' informational costs (required to remain high profit)  do not exceed arbitrage
gains. For that matter, even average-cost producers can garner positive profits if local cash price disequilibria are uncovered.
Of course, market efficiency is a continuum, ranging  from efficient (in the theoretically pure economic sense) to inefficient
(in the business world sense). Extension economists focus on that end of the spectrum expected to most elevate understanding
among their producer audience. This study focuses on futures efficiency and cash market inefficiency based on the supposition
that producers might be better off if they placed less emphasis on marketing strategies which explicitly or implicitly depend
on favorable futures price changes.
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prices are inexpensive to obtain and are at least as accurate as commercial and public
providers  of price  forecasts  (Just  and  Rausser;  Marines-Filho  and  Irwin;  Kastens,
Schroeder,  and Plain).  Adding historical  basis to deferred  futures  prices provides  a
simple and reasonably  accurate procedure  for using futures prices to formulate cash
price  expectations (Kastens, Jones, and Schroeder),  and simple crop basis projection
methods are often as accurate as more complex ones (Dhuyvetter and Kastens).
Given grain futures efficiency,  accuracy, and ubiquity, and given the simplicity and
accuracy of futures-plus-historical-basis cash price forecasts, using deferred futures plus
historical basis as cash price expectations in grain storage returns models is appealing.
Also, as long as futures prices and basis expectations are unbiased, resulting storage
returns  over time should not depend on actually taking the associated  storage hedge
futures positions. Nonetheless,  considering both hedged and unhedged storage might
reveal interesting risk/rewards tradeoffs. Further, in an Ohio corn storage study, Zulauf
and Irwin found that hedged storage was more profitable than unhedged when using
expected basis changes to guide storage decisions.
Because  of such grain storage  mechanics  as grain handling and elevating,  which
tend to be one-time events,  and monitoring  and aerating,  which tend to be ongoing
events, grain storage costs can be characterized as the sum of fixed and variable  cost
components.  For example, the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project
(Jackson, Irwin, and Good), which examines  pricing performance of market advisory
services  and relies  on grain storage costs,  applies  a cost structure  considered repre-
sentative of commercial storage in the Corn Belt-a fixed storage cost of 130 per bushel
for corn and soybeans from October  15 through December 31, and a 20 per bushel per
month charge thereafter.  Other studies have used only variable storage costs,  either
to represent reality  or to impose  simplicity  (e.g.,  Heifner;  Fackler  and  Livingston).
For Kansas,  commercial  grain  storage  costs are characterized  as variable  cost only
[U.S.  Department of Agriculture  (USDA), "Summary of Offer Rates for Country Ele-
vators"].
Opportunity,  or interest, costs for stored grain are potentially  complicated because
reduced-interest  grain storage  loans  traditionally  have been available  to producers
through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) under the USDA, albeit typically for
less than 100% of the market value of the grain stored. Further, how a producer uses
the cash generated from grain sales (e.g., add to savings or pay off loans) will determine
appropriate grain storage interest costs for that producer. The important point is that,
to ensure reasonable inferences, when alternative producer behavior is posited across
different storage cost scenarios, the scenarios should involve reasonable  estimates of
interest and storage costs.
Storage Simulation Procedure
This research relies on a simulation of grain storage  decisions based on futures plus
basis cash price forecasts that lead to expected storage returns conditional on alterna-
tive  storage  cost scenarios.  As  with all  simulations,  understanding the  underlying
assumptions, decision  rules, and data is crucial to judging the validity of the process.
Thus, a careful  description of this information is warranted.
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Grain  Storage Rule or  Model
In each week t, beginning at harvest (t = harvest), a grain producer looks ahead to all
possible  future  weeks  {t + 1 ...  t +  H}, where  H  is the maximum  look-ahead  horizon
available, and then calculates an expected return to storage for each week. An expected
return for horizon h (i.e., week t + h) is calculated as: the expected selling price in week
t + h less the  market price  in week t  (current  price)  less interest  and storage  costs
accrued over h weeks (as used here, returns are net returns-net of costs). If any of
the {t +  1 ... t +  H}  expected  returns are positive, grain is stored from week t to week
t +  1.  In that case, the producer steps ahead to week t + 1,  now labeling that week as t,
and begins the  expected  storage  returns  calculations  anew.  On the  other hand,  if
all  {t + 1  ...  t +  H} expected returns are nonpositive, all grain is immediately  sold (in
week t), and the producer waits until the next harvest before  again engaging in the
look-ahead  expected storage  returns process. Note that there is nothing in the grain
storage model that precludes storing grain beyond the crop year, thus simultaneously
storing multiple harvests.2 Nor is the basic storage model based on taking futures hedge
positions.
Futures  Hedging Rule or Model
Whenever futures hedges are considered in this study, they are classical hedges where
some short futures position is held for exactly as long as grain is stored. However, unlike
the grain storage  rule where  storage depends  only on identifying  some point in the
future  associated  with  expected  positive  storage  returns,  choosing  which  futures
contract to hedge with depends on identifying that point in the future where expected
positive  storage  returns  are greatest.  The  contract that will  be the nearby  at that
time is the one that is sold for the storage hedge.  Each week that grain is stored, the
search  for maximum  hedged  storage  returns  begins  anew.  If the  expected  storage
returns to some week for a contract other than the one already held are  sufficiently
greater (enough  to cover transaction  costs) than the expected returns to any of the
weeks involving the contract already held, the futures position is rolled to the second
contract.
Like the grain  storage rule, the hedging rule depends  only on expected basis and
efficient  futures.  There  is  nothing  in the rule that precludes  being  in  one  futures
contract for a while, moving to another, and then back to the same contract.  The deci-
sion is guided by maximizing expected returns to storage each week grain is stored.
When the storage rule no longer signals grain storage, futures hedges are also lifted-
because no expected returns to storage are positive at that point.
2Considering that most grain tends to leave producer hands in the months surrounding harvest, and the additional on-farm
storage capacity  potentially required, it might not seem appropriate  to consider storage  across harvest years.  However,
Kansas  elevator storage  rates  do not distinguish  between  harvest years, and grain always can be  moved from farm to
commercial storage preceding  the next harvest. In fact, it is assumed to have to move there to be sold anyway. Thus, as long
as storage costs are appropriately considered,  and as long as it makes sense to rely on futures-based storage signals, there
is little reason to disregard  those signals merely because grain has already remained  in storage for some arbitrary time
period.
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Benchmarks for Comparison
How should the grain storage model be evaluated by researchers  and potential users?
One possibility is to test historically whether the model generated positive returns to
storage. On average, was the model's harvest-equivalent price (sale price less interest
and storage costs) greater than the harvest price? That evaluation method has at least
two problems. First, in small samples, average returns to storage are highly conditional
on observed  price  patterns  in individual  years,  so  model  evaluation  is masked  by
underlying price movements. Second, storage returns are highly conditional on storage
costs. Not "allowing" the benchmark (harvest sales) to capture returns to storage would
bias the analysis in favor of the storage model for especially low-cost storers.  There,
model evaluation is masked because grain markets are expected to yield profits to low-
cost grain storers, with or without the use of a model.
A second  way for evaluating the grain  storage  model's  success  is to test storage
returns when using the model against those of a representative grain marketer over the
same time period. Producers typically market crops throughout the crop year (although
disproportionate shares are marketed around harvest). This evaluation method answers
the intuitively appealing question: Would marketing grain using this model have been
more profitable  than typically  observed  during the period examined?  Moreover,  by
assigning the representative marketer the same storage cost structure as a model user,
this process should not give undo credit to the model if storage costs are assumed low.3
While some comparisons are made with prices available at harvest, this research focuses
on comparing model-based storage returns with representative returns.4
Expected Prices
Expected prices  are deferred futures prices  plus historical basis. Following  Hauser,
Garcia, and Tumblin; Jiang and Hayenga; and Kenyon and Kingsley, three-year his-
torical bases are generally used in the simulations, but the process is tested with an
alternative that makes use of current basis information. Namely, the three-year histor-
ical average  basis (for the time of year being forecasted)  is averaged with the current
basis (at the time a forecast is made).
3It is probable that a producer with low (high) storage costs has a different pattern of marketings than the representative
marketer; however, information to identify such patterns is not available. Thus, the marketing pattern for the representative
marketer is assumed to be the same regardless  of cost structure.
4 Using the representative  returns framework  should help determine whether observed storage returns when following
the model are actually due to the model. Nonetheless, tests of rule-based marketing strategies in small samples are always
plagued with low power, and more conclusive evidence always awaits additional years of data. Other benchmarks might be
considered. For example, AgMAS currently uses an average of forward cash contract prices for harvest time delivery before
harvest, and actual cash prices (adjusted for storage and interest) after harvest. The data to calculate these benchmarks were
unavailable  for this  study.  As will  be described  later, representative  marketings  depend  on  USDA-reported  crop  year
marketings (through its  Kansas  Agricultural  Statistics). These values include forward-contracted  grain as well as cash sales,
potentially introducing error when a period's observed cash price is assigned to marketings for that period. Assuming efficient
futures and accurate basis projections would mitigate that error as more years are aggregated in an analysis, but a small risk-
adjustment bias would likely still exist (biasing the representative  price downward)-because  forward contracting transfers
risk to elevators. Nonetheless,  using the representative benchmark seems more reasonable than using other assumptions
regarding time-distributed grain sales following harvest. For example, using equal sales per period would be inappropriate
because there is little evidence producers market grain in that manner.
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Marketing Year Start (Harvest)
A post-harvest returns-to-storage marketing study logically should begin around harvest
each year. For this Kansas study, a reasonable starting point is the week at which 50%
of the Kansas  crop is harvested.  However,  some producers  might begin post-harvest
marketing early  or late in the harvest; thus weeks when 20% and 80% of harvest is
complete are considered as well. (Zulaufand Irwin found returns to routine storage were
highest for a mid-harvest beginning.) Except where the distinction is needed, the mar-
keting year beginning point (which varies from year to year) is simply referred to as
harvest.5
Representative  Marketer and Representative Price
The representative marketer is one who, in each week of  each year, markets that portion
of his crop which equals the estimated portion of the total Kansas crop marketed by all
producers in that week of that year. The representative price is the harvest-equivalent
(adjusted for storage and interest costs), marketings-weighted price of the representa-
tive marketer.
Interest and Futures Transaction  Charges
Two interest rates are considered in the simulations, a bank loan rate and a CCC loan
rate reflecting the cost of funds when government commodity loans are taken. Because
CCC loans are typically not for 100% of grain market value, charging CCC rates against
market price tends to understate actual interest costs for government loan holders-
especially  in years  of high market  prices.  Nonetheless,  the goal  is  to  make  some
allowance for alternative interest rates. The precise historical accuracy of interest rates
used is not particularly relevant because model users and nonusers are each charged the
same interest rate. Returns to futures hedges and rolling from one contract to another
based on projected returns to storage must account for futures transaction costs. This
study assumes those costs to be 1.5¢/bushel throughout.
Storage Costs
At harvest, grain is considered either sold or placed in storage.  Farm and commercial
storage are differentiated  only by the storage costs.  Commercial storage  cost is sim-
ulated by  assigning commercial  storage rates  throughout.  According  to the USDA's
"Summary of Offer Rates for Country Elevators," annual commercial grain storage rates
for 1987-98 averaged 2.6¢ per bushel expressed on a per month basis for each of wheat,
6Although year-specific Kansas harvest dates are considered, location-specific harvest dates are not. It is assumed that
the point-of-harvest data resolution used is adequate to allow practical generalizations. Furthermore, although the harvest
date could impact whether or not grain storage is initiated, ongoing storage depends on projected returns to storage from each
week following harvest.
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corn, milo, and soybeans. Further, with standard deviations around 0.06  per bushel (on
a per month basis), the rates were quite stable over the time period. Communication
with several grain elevator operators confirmed that rate and further revealed that it
is customary  for Kansas  elevators to have a 30-day  grace  period after grain is first
delivered to an elevator (grain sold within 30 days has no storage charge, but is charged
31 days of storage if sold on day 31). Consequently, the commercial storage rate simu-
lated is 0.650 per bushel per week,  with a four-week grace period.
Because  grain is assumed  delivered  to a commercial  elevator  at some point,  and
becausd  e grain would be  stored  commercially  if that were  less  expensive than farm
storage,  simulated relevant farm storage rates generally should be less than or equal
to commercial rates. To cover alternative cost structures, simulated farm storage rates
used here  contain  fixed  and variable  components,  in  two  basic farm  storage  rates.
Farm storage rate #1 assumes a 9¢ fixed charge coupled with a 1.10 monthly charge.
This is an arbitrary division of fixed and variable charges that equates to commercial
rates at six months. Farms with this storage cost structure would be better off storing
on-farm than in commercial  elevators as long as the grain was held for at least six
months. But short-term on-farm storage would have  large penalties relative to com-
mercial storage, which is as it should be if physically moving grain in and out of storage
is costly.
At harvest, grain must be hauled somewhere. It  seems reasonable that some farms
would want to avoid hauling grain to commercial elevators during harvest in order to
avoid the high opportunity cost of machinery and labor associated with long distances
to elevators  or long waits to unload at elevators. Also,  some farms may expect gains
associated with the marketing flexibility of on-farm storage (e.g., truck bids, or bids from
more than one elevator). Such situations can be represented with a fixed cost wedge
between commercial and farm storage costs. Thus, farm storage rate #2 uses the same
1.1¢ monthly variable cost as rate #1, but assumes an arbitrary fixed cost of -9. 6 Farms
with this storage cost structure have a high market incentive to store grain, much as
they  would  have  in the examples just  given.  Regardless  of the  farm  storage  rate
considered,  to  simulate making  room for the  new crop,  all grain stored  beyond  11
months accrues storage costs at commercial rates.
Multiple Grain Sales
Because producers demonstrate multiple sales for each crop harvested, grain storage is
not typically an all-or-nothing decision, and modifications to the grain storage model
should  allow for that. Furthermore,  a producer may not wish to commit all of a crop
to  one marketing  rule.  Functionally, that is like  initiating the storage  model  from
different vantage points following harvest. For example, for cash flow or other reasons,
a grain marketer may choose to sell a portion of his/her crop at harvest (or even ahead
6 Because the representative marketer holds nearly  100% of his grain in storage as of the first week following harvest
(when the fixed cost is assessed), the -90  benefits both the representative and the model follower who may have been induced
(by the -9c) to hold grain at least one week. If the -9¢ is insufficient  to initiate storage for the model  follower, causing
him/her to sell at harvest, then that benefit is relinquished, which is as it should be if the model follower is relying on model-
based storage signals-even though the representative marketer still captures that gain. The intent is to capture meaningful
storage cost structures with a minimum of alternative simulations.
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of harvest)  and not revisit the marketing task on the remainder until a later date.
Here,  we  consider  starting  the  model  eight  weeks  after  harvest  to  capture  this
possibility. For each year, at the selected model starting date, grain that was already
marketed by a representative marketer is also considered sold in the same manner by
the model marketer. Thus, for the later model starting date, it is somewhat less likely
that a model follower would receive a different average price than the representative
marketer.
Data
The base data used here are Wednesday closing cash prices for Kansas markets from
January  1982 through  December  1998.  Prices  were available  from  23  locations  for
wheat,  11 for corn,  17 for milo, and 13 for soybeans.  Cash price  data were collected
in four-week months, or 48-week years; 4th and 5th Wednesday prices were averaged
and reported as one value in months with five Wednesdays  (see Kastens, Jones, and
Schroeder  for additional data detail).  Kansas City wheat, Chicago corn, and Chicago
soybean  nearby  and  deferred  futures  prices  were  collected  in  the  same  manner
and matched to the cash prices.  Consistent with elevator behavior,  nearby contracts
avoid delivery months (e.g., the May contract is the nearby in March, even though a
March contract trades). Cash and nearby futures prices allowed construction of current
and  historical  average  nearby  basis  values  (milo  used  corn  futures).  A three-year
historical  average  basis, and  a combined  average  of three-year  historical  basis and
nearby basis provided  two alternative basis projections. Basis projections  were added
to deferred futures prices to give cash price expectations. Conditional upon the existence
of observed  deferred futures  trading prices each week, cash price  expectations,  and
potential hedge prices if relevant, were formulated up to 45 weeks ahead. Any grain in
storage or open futures positions at the last week in December 1998 are considered sold
and closed then.
Post-harvest  marketing  years  were  constructed  corresponding  to  harvest  years
1985-97 (1982-84  data were used  to initialize  models;  post-1998 harvest data were
insufficient to consider the 1998 harvest). To determine which week should be used to
begin the marketing year for each crop each year, the USDA's weekly "Crop Progress
Reports" were used to identify the week closest to 20%, 50%, and 80% completion from
1985-97.  The respective average, minimum, and maximum  50%-completion calendar
weeks were  as follows:  wheat 23.9,  23,  25;  corn  36.6,  35,  38; milo  39.1,  37,  41; and
soybeans 38.1,37,41. These averages correspond to the 4th week in June, the 1st week
in October, the 3rd week in October, and the 2nd week in October for wheat, corn, milo,
and soybeans, respectively. On average, 20%- and 80%-completion dates were two weeks
earlier  and  later,  respectively,  than the  50%-completion  dates  for  corn,  milo,  and
soybeans, and one week earlier and later for wheat.
Marketing year weekly marketing portions are needed to construct the representative
price series, with a marketing year beginning the week of harvest and ending the week
preceding harvest of  the following year. Monthly Kansas crop marketings obtained from
Kansas Agricultural Statistics (USDA)  apply to  official  12-month  crop  years where
wheat begins in June, and corn, milo, and soybeans begin in September. Official crop
years do not coincide exactly with this study's marketing years. Additionally, reported
crop marketings do not distinguish old and new crop sales. Thus, some modification was
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required to develop the weekly marketings numbers underlying this study's representa-
tive price series.7
Annual average interest rates charged by banks on new non-real estate farm loans
were collected from the Federal Reserve System's Agricultural  Finance  Databook and
assigned to weeks by calendar year. Monthly average CCC interest rates were obtained
directly from the USDA's "Commodity Credit Corporation's Interest Rate Charges" and
assigned  to weeks.  CCC  rates  were  unavailable  for some  months  in  1995-97.  The
proportional month-to-month change in prime loan rates (from the electronic database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) was used to construct a proxy for the CCC rate
for each missing period. From 1985 through December 1998, the average annual interest
rates were 8.46% and 6.48%, respectively, for the bank and the CCC.
Simulation Results
To explore the stability of the futures-based hedged and unhedged grain storage models
tested, several simulation runs were performed. Marketing patterns (percentage  sold
each week each year) for the benchmark representative marketer do not change across
simulation runs, except when considering different marketing year starting dates (early,
mid, and late, corresponding to 20%-, 50%-, and  ec80%-harvest  completion dates). None-
theless, the representative price typically does change across runs  nbecause interest rates
and storage costs impact returns for both the representative marketer and the storage
model.  To provide sufficient depth to the exposition, much of the  resultns focus on there
base run (e.g., all figures and tables 1 and 2). The base run assumes the marketing year
begins at mid-harvest and the storage model begins the same week. Three-year basis
histories are used in cash price expectations, interest charges are based on bank (rather
than CCC) interest rates, and storage charges  are 2.6¢  per bushel per month (0.65¢/
week), which is the commercial  storage rate.8
To help visualize marketing patterns of the representative marketer, figures 1-4 show
average weekly Kansas marketing year marketings aggregated by month for each crop
(wheat,  soybeans,  corn,  and  milo,  respectively)  using  the  marketings  calculation
procedures discussed earlier  and the base run mid-harvest  marketing year starting
dates. The figures span more than  12 calendar months-because the marketing years
typically involve all or part of 13 calendar months, and because harvest times vary from
7As a first step in constructing the representative  price series, reported Kansas crop marketings for only the first month
of each official crop year were adjusted downward-by the average marketings in the last month of 1982-97 official crop
years-to reflect the fact that a portion of old crop tends to carry into the new crop year and is counted as marketings there.
Next,  these slightly modified (new-crop-only)  official monthly marketing weights were assigned to weeks (the September
weight to each week in September, and so on). Here, marketing year weeks that run past the end of the official crop year were
assigned the same weights as those of the last month of the official crop year (e.g., the four September and two October weeks
at the end of a typical milo marketing year were assigned the August weights).  To ensure that this study's marketing year
marketings-to-date  were  compatible  with  those of the new-crop-only  official  monthly series,  "catch-up" marketing was
assumed at harvest. For example, the marketing weight for milo in the week of a typical harvest (third week of October) was
actually the sum of the marketing weights  for the four September weeks and the first three weeks of October. Finally, all
weekly marketing weights were normalized to sum to one over the marketing year.
8 Basis projections from historical three-year average  bases were generally unbiased. That is, from June  1985  through
December 1998 for wheat (the period covered by the simulations), the mean error (actual basis less projection at the time it
was forecasted) was 0.23¢/bushel. From October 1985 through December 1998, mean errors of basis projections for corn, milo,
and soybeans were -2.1¢,  -0.48¢, and -0.42¢  per bushel, respectively.
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year to year. Marketings are highest around harvest, with substantially lower market-
ings over the last half of the marketing year.
To put the base models' results in perspective,  figures 5-8  show the harvest-equiv-
alent prices for each crop (wheat, soybeans,  corn, and milo, respectively)  by year and
averaged across locations for: (a) the harvest price, or that obtained by someone mar-
keting 100%  of a year's crop  at harvest;  (b) the representative  price,  which  is that
obtained by a marketer whose sales and storage patterns each year mirror those of a
typical Kansas producer that year (those represented in figures 1-4); (c) the unhedged
model price, which is the price obtained by a marketer following the base model without
hedging; and (d) the hedged model price. Although some years show substantial dispar-
ity among the four location-average  prices  (e.g.,  1996  on corn  and milo,  or  1987  on
soybeans), the four prices  for a crop do not appear dramatically different on average.
Hedged and unhedged bars are especially  close, presenting a graphical confirmation
of futures market  efficiency.  On average,  the base storage model  for a crop appears
reasonable, and marketers should not be averse to following it over time. However, there
appears to be no compelling reason to follow the model either.
Table 1 (wheat and soybeans) and table 2 (corn and milo) show the annual advantage
to following the base storage model, either unhedged or hedged, over the representative
marketer for various Kansas locations. All 23 locations for wheat had positive advan-
tages for both unhedged and hedged models. Observing at least 23 of 23 locations where
the model's gain was positive is highly improbable (see the  > 0 count p-value row in
tables  1  and  2)  if model versus  representative  superiority  for each  location  can be
thought of as a binomial, or coin-flipping, experiment  where the probability of model
superiority is considered to be 0.5. Thus, if inferences are to be made about a random,
or typical, wheat location, the results suggest that the grain storage model is success-
ful as  a grain storage  strategy,  with or  without hedging.  But,  for inferences  about
individual  wheat locations,  results  are far less conclusive.  Only  one  of 23  locations
(Marysville) had average  unhedged  model  gains  statistically different  from  zero,  as
judged by a paired t-test across the 13 yearly observations (1985-97) of wheat price for
each location  (table  1). None  of the locational  average  hedged model advantages  for
wheat were significantly different from zero. On average, across the 23 wheat locations,
the  model  advantages  were  11¢/bushel  and  8.1¢/bushel  for  unhedged  and  hedged
models, respectively.
Unhedged soybean results (the right half of table  1) are similar to wheat, with 13 of
13 locations showing higher prices for the model than for the representative marketer,
and an average price that is 27.1¢ per bushel higher for the model. Also, 9 of 13 loca-
tions had statistically greater unhedged  model prices-which means that inferences
apply to most individual soybean  locations.  On the other hand, hedged results were
dramatically  different.  There,  although  10 of 13  locations displayed positive average
model gains, none were significantly different from zero. In general, the results broadly
support using futures-based cash price expectations as indicators of returns to storage
for wheat and soybeans. But, neither wheat nor soybean results support the idea that
projected storage returns must be hedged.
Results for corn and milo (table 2)  are dramatically different than those for wheat
and soybeans. The unhedged storage model's price was lower than the representative
marketer's for all 11 corn locations and all 17 milo locations, and the hedged model price
was lower for all 11 corn locations and 14 of 17 milo locations. The binomial experiment
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Figure 3.  Average representative  Kansas marketings
by month (1985-97): Corn
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Figure 5.  Wheat harvest-equivalent  prices by year (1985-97),
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Figure 6.  Soybean harvest-equivalent  prices by year (1985-97),
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Figure 7.  Corn harvest-equivalent prices by year (1985-97),
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Figure 8.  Milo harvest-equivalent prices by year (1985-97),
average of 23 Kansas locations
Kastens and Dhuyvetter
1￿  = f%  ----  -Journal  ofAgricultural and Resource Economics
Table 1.  Advantage of Base Storage Model over Representative Kansas Marketer,
Risk Advantage for Hedged over Unhedged Storage, and Weeks Stored: Wheat and
Soybeans,  Average  1985-97
WHEAT (23 locations)  SOYBEANS (13 locations)
Unhedged  Hedged  Risk  Storage  Unhedged  Hedged  Risk  Storage
Model  Model  Advantage  Time from  Model  Model  Advantage  Time from
Advantage  Advantage  for Hedged  Harvest  Advantage  Advantage  for Hedged  Harvest
Kansas Location  (¢/bu/yr)  (¢/bu/yr)  (%  reduce)a  (wks/yr)  (¢/bu/yr)  (¢/bu/yr)  (%  reduce)
a (wks/yr)
1. Andale  5.3
2.  Beloit  10.3
3.  Colby  8.8
4.  Concordia  9.2
5.  Dodge City  5.4
6.  Emporia  11.8
7.  Garden City  8.3
8.  Great Bend  14.2










10.  Hoxie  9.9  4.9  1.5
11.  Hutchinson  18.0  8.2  -2.8
12.  Kansas City  18.7  15.5  9.8
13.  Liberal  13.5  11.4  1.7
14.  Marysville  22.3*  7.1  -35.4
15.  Pratt  7.6  7.5  5.2
16.  Russell  4.1  6.3  -2.9
17.  Salina  12.2  4.1  -7.5
18.  Scott City  4.9  17.3  26.2




















23.3  2.4  -9.6
30.2*  -0.7  -40.0
17.6  3.4  31.9
17.9*  1.6  -54.5
27.9*  -4.9  -122.0
13.0  0.1  -42.7





35.2*  1.2  -19.1
14.6*  -0.7  -61.4
-1.6  12.5  65.2*  7.1
21.  Wellington  9.0  10.6  6.9
22.  Whitewater  10.9  5.5  -13.2
23.  Wichita  8.2  10.4  6.7
15.0  - -
16.1
14.7
16.7 4.6  -29.2 13.9
Average  11.0  8.1  -1.4  15.9  27.1  2.1  -34.0  12.9
Total Locations:  23  23  23  - 13  13  13  -
No. >0  23  23  10  - 13  10  1  -
p-value (>  0 count)  0.0 0b  . 0 0b  0.34c  - 0.00b  0.05b  0.00  _
No.  < > 0(statis.)  1  0  0  - 9  0  0
Notes:  Base model uses mid-harvest start, three-year historical basis, bank interest rate, and 2.60/bushel/month physical
storage cost. An asterisk (*) denotes  significance at the 0.10 level in a two-tailed paired t-test across  13 annual (1985-97)
observations in "Model Advantage"  columns, and in a two-tailed F-test of equal variances in "Risk Advantage" columns.
a% reduce is: 100(1 - hedged/unhedged),  for variance  of 13  annual model prices  (> 0 implies hedging reduces risk).
bProbability of drawing at least the observed number of positive advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
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Table 2. Advantage of Base Storage Model over Representative Kansas Marketer,
Risk Advantage for Hedged over Unhedged Storage, and Weeks Stored: Corn and
Milo, Average  1985-97
CORN (11 locations)  MILO  (17 locations)
Unhedged  Hedged  Risk  Storage  Unhedged  Hedged  Risk  Storage
Model  Model  Advantage  Time from  Model  Model  Advantage  Time from
Advantage  Advantage  for Hedged  Harvest  Advantage  Advantage  for Hedged  Harvest
Kansas Location  (¢/bu/yr)  (¢/bu/yr)  (%  reduce)
a (wks/yr)  (¢/bu/yr)  (¢/bu/yr)  (%  reduce)a  (wks/yr)
1. Andale-
2.  Beloit  -
3.  Colby  -30.9*  -19.5*  29.2
4.  Concordia  --  -
5.  Dodge City  -8.6  -11.6  27.6
6.  Emporia  -7.0  -5.8  31.1
7.  Garden City  -12.5  -4.9  43.6
8.  Great Bend  -15.4  -11.7  -5.9
9.  Hays-  -
10.  Hoxie  - -
11.  Hutchinson  -32.2*  -19.7*  27.2
12.  Kansas City  -21.1  -14.8  37.5
13.  Liberal  --  -
14.  Marysville  -
15.  Pratt  -34.5*  -23.4*  19.9
16.  Russell  -
17.  Salina  -
18.  Scott City  -21.7*  -20.0*  -7.8
19.  St. Francis  -
--- 35.4*  -16.0*
- -26.2*  -12.2


































-2.2  -5.3  -11.9 27.2 -23.7*  -7.6
21.  Wellington
22.  Whitewater  -5.2
23.  Wichita
-8.1  31.7 31.8 -6.9  -10.8
-26.4*  -12.2
Average  -17.4  -13.2  20.2  33.4  -19.7  -7.4  23.3  30.1
Total Locations:  11  11  11  - 17  17  17
No. >0  0  0  8  - 0  3  16  -
p-value (> 0 count)  0.00C  0.00°  0 11b  -0.100  0.01  0.0  0 b  -
No.  < > 0 (statis.)  4  4  0  - 8  1  0  -
Notes:  Base model uses mid-harvest  start, three-year historical basis, bank interest rate, and 2.6i/bushelmonth physical
storage cost. An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 0.10 level in a two-tailed paired t-test across 13 annual (1985-97)
observations in "Model Advantage"  columns, and in a two-tailed F-test of equal variances in "Risk Advantage" columns.
a%  reduce is: 100(1 - hedged/unhedged),  for variance of 13  annual model prices (> 0 implies hedging reduces risk).
b Probability of drawing at least the observed number of positive advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
c  Probability of drawing at most the observed number of positive advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
20.  Topeka 18.8  28.8
13.5  35.8
25.3  38.9
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probabilities associated with this many locations showing negative model gains were
quite low. But, as in wheat, many locational values were not significantly different from
zero, making many location-specific  inferences suspect.
Clearly, the storage model does not perform well for corn and milo relative to wheat
and soybeans, although hedging tended to mitigate the corn and milo storage losses. In
general, the "Storage Time" columns of tables  1 and 2 show that the storage model
stores corn and milo longer than wheat and soybeans. Although not shown, the storage
model generally signaled storing corn and milo for many weeks following the 1996 and
1997 harvests-in spite of generally falling futures prices during those time periods.
Moreover, December 1998 found both  1996 and 1997 corn crops still in storage for a
number of locations.  Because of falling prices during those  time periods, the hedged
model tended to keep net storage returns from being a complete disaster. For example,
for corn harvested in 1996 in Colby, Kansas, which was still in storage and presumed
sold at the end of 1998, the unhedged model price was only $0.59/bushel and the hedged
price was $1.12. However, neither price was attractive compared to the representative
price of $2.37 or the harvest price of $2.72. Such low model-based prices call to question
whether producers would actually have the courage to stay with such marketing strate-
gies even if they were believed to be successful in the long run.
Tables  1 and 2 showed base run results by location and reported the probability of
drawing at least (at most) the observed number of positive values where that number
was >=  (<) half the total number of locations in a binomial experiment. Results were
also examined by year, and years were counted (out of 13) where the model was superior
on average across locations. Although that analysis generally confirmed results in tables
1  and 2,  the  model  advantage  for wheat and  soybeans over  corn and milo  was not
as pronounced. For wheat, in 9 of 13 years the unhedged model's gain was positive, and
in 11  of 13 years the model's gain was statistically different  from zero.  The p-value
associated with the at least 9 out of 13 counts is 0.13. Greater-than-zero  year counts,
statistically-different-from-zero  year counts, and associatedp-values for the other crops
are: corn 7,  7, 0.50 (at least 7 out of 13); milo 5,  10, 0.29 (at most 5 out of 13); and soy-
beans  11,  9, 0.01 (at least 11 out of 13).
Besides showing gains (over the representative marketer) in profitability associated
with the  unhedged and  hedged  storage  models,  tables  1  and 2  also  depict the  risk
reduction associated with hedged over unhedged grain storage-in terms of percentage
reduction in variance of 13 annual model prices. Once again, corn and milo behave much
differently than wheat and soybeans. On average, across the pricing locations, hedged
storage reduced risk 20.2% and 23.3% over unhedged storage for corn and milo, respec-
tively.  Conversely,  risk  was  increased  1.4%  and  34%,  respectively,  for  wheat  and
soybeans. That hedging had kept 1996 and 1997 corn and milo storage losses from being
as large as they would have been without hedging also meant that price variance was
smaller with hedging. Hedge-induced risk reduction was highly variable across locations
for all crops. None of the locational changes in variance were significantly different from
zero based on a two-tailed F-test at the 0.10 significance level.
Statistically significant locational values in tables 1 and 2 suggest locational market
inefficiencies  that might be  exploited for profit. Yet the question remains: Are these
equilibria departures actually systematic, and thus repeatable? Or, are the statistically
significant historical runs merely random events in a bigger picture? Had the analysis
ended  with  soybeans, where  many locations  had positive  and significant  unhedged
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storage  model profits, it would  be tempting  to extol the virtues of a well-conceived,
efficient-futures, less-efficient-cash,  storage signal framework. The immediate inference
would be that soybean producers could profit from following the storage model at certain
locations.  However,  no soybean  locations had  significant hedged  model advantages,
suggesting that large unhedged soybean advantages may have been accidental rather
than due to some well thought out storage model. Further, the negative model advan-
tages for corn and milo would likely further diminish confidence in the soybean storage
model's future success.
For example, a Hutchinson, Pratt, or Scott City soybean  and corn producer  would
likely question  the expected  advantage  to following  the storage model  for soybeans,
which had positive  and  significant historical  advantages,  when both unhedged  and
hedged storage model advantages  for corn are negative and significant in these loca-
tions. Clearly, given storage model disparities across crops, more in-depth, crop-specific
information  is needed to induce marketing  economists  or producers  to follow  or not
follow the storage models-which is beyond the scope of this study. Alternatively, with
additional years  of data,  such  disparities  might  disappear.  As  is often  the  case  in
economic analyses, these results point to the difficulty of combining statistical signifi-
cance and economic theory into meaningful generalizations.
Tables  1 and 2 offer few marketing strategy recommendations that can be made with
confidence across all crops (no locational geographical patterns emerged either). Follow-
ing the unhedged storage model seemed profitable for wheat and soybeans, but not for
corn and milo. Hedging appeared to reduce profitability (over not hedging) for wheat
and soybeans, but increased it for corn and milo. Hedging appeared to reduce risk for
corn and milo, but increased it for wheat and soybeans. One consistency that did emerge
across all crops is that the price received with hedged storage was closer to that received
by the representative marketer than the price received with unhedged storage.
How sensitive was the grain storage model to different assumptions for basis projec-
tions, marketing year starting dates, model starting dates, interest rates, and storage
rates? Table 3 reports these results for wheat and soybeans  and table 4 for corn and
milo.  For reference,  the "Base Run" column in table 3 (table 4) reports the identical
information  reported  at the  bottom  of table  1  (table  2).  Each  subsequent  column,
beginning with "Different Basis" and ending with "Farm Store #2," shows results for a
different simulation. Only selected departures from the base model will be noted in the
discussion around tables 3 and 4, which follows immediately. As with tables 1 and 2, few
results are statistically important and inferences are highly suspect.
Using an average of three-year historical basis and current basis rather than only the
three-year historical basis (the "Different Basis" column) resulted in decreased risk with
hedging for wheat. Now, 19 of 23 locations had risk reduced with hedging, compared to
only 10 locations in the base wheat model. Also, with the alternative basis specification,
the hedged risk advantage was greater for soybeans  and milo, but not for corn. The
hedged model  advantage rose substantially for milo with the new basis specification.
Now, 16 of 17 milo locations had positive gains to the hedged model, compared to only
3 of 17 in the base run.
The "Harvest Early" and "Harvest Late" columns of tables 3 and 4 depict marketing
year initiations at  20% and 80% harvest  completion, respectively.  Zulauf and Irwin
found larger returns to routine storage if initiated at mid-harvest.  In this study, mid-
harvest signaled  unhedged storage returns were smaller for wheat, corn, and milo, but
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Table 3. Advantage of Storage Model over Representative Kansas Marketer, Risk
Advantage for Hedged over Unhedged Storage, and Weeks Stored: Various Simu-
lations, Wheat and Soybeans,  1985-97
SIMULATION SCENARIO
Late  Farm  Farm
Simulation Parameter or  Base  Different  Harvest  Harvest  Model  Low  Store  Store
Output Information  Run  Basis  Early  Late  Start  Interest  #1  #2
Harvest time  mid  mid  early  late  mid  mid  mid  mid
Weeks after harvest model starts  0  0  0  0  8  0  0  0
Basis  3-yr.  3-yr. &  cur.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.
Interest rate  bank  bank  bank  bank  bank  CCC  bank  bank
Variable storage rate (¢/bu/mo)  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  1.1  1.1
Fixed storage rate (¢/bu)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.0  -9.0
WHEAT (23 locations)
Unhedged model advantage (0/bu/yr)  11.0  8.8  13.7  7.0  -0.6  10.0  11.9  7.5
No. locations > 0  23  23  23  22  9  23  23  23
p-value (> 0 count)  O. 0 0b  O. 00 b  O. 00b  0.00 b  0.20c  0.00b  O. 0 0 b  . 0 0b
No.  locations < > 0 (statis.)  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0
Hedged model advantage  (¢/bu/yr)  8.1  10.9  13.5  3.2  -3.5  6.9  13.0  4.4
No. locations > 0  23  23  23  20  4  23  23  21
p-value  (> 0 count)  O. 00b  O. 00 b  O. 00b  O. 00b  0.00  O. 0 0b  O. 00b  O. 0 0b
No. locations < > 0 (statis.)  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0
Hedged risk advantage (%  reduce)a  -1.4  7.3  -10.6  -3.7  0.2  0.8  4.9  -1.7
No. locations >  0  10  19  5  9  12  12  12  11
p-value (> 0 count)  0.34c  0.0 0b  0.01C  0.20C  0.50b  0.50b  0.50b  0.500
No. locations  < > 0 (statis.)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Storage time from harvest (wks/yr)  15.9  14.7  15.6  15.7  23.3  17.9  14.2  20.3
SOYBEANS (13 locations)
Unhedged model advantage (¢/bu/yr)  27.1  24.9  24.9  26.8  18.4  26.9  31.6  28.0
No. locations >  0  13  13  13  13  13  ~  13  13  13
p-value (>  0 count)  .o 0 0 b  O. 00b  O. 00b  O. 00 b  0.00b  0.00b  O. 0 0 b  0. 0 0b
No. locations < >  0 (statis.)  9  11  6  9  7  7  10  10
Hedged model advantage  (¢/bu/yr)  2.1  4.4  1.1  1.7  5.9  3.8  5.6  3.5
No. locations > 0  10  12  7  11  12  12  12  12
p-value (> 0 count)  0.05b  0. 0 0 b  0.50b  0.01b  O.00b  0.00b  O. 00b  0. 0 0b
No. locations < > 0 (statis.)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Hedged risk advantage (%  reduce)a  -34.0  -11.1  -62.0  -13.0  -9.8  -25.1  -8.6  -30.8
No. locations > 0  1  3  1  2  5  3  3  1
p-value (> 0 count)  0.00  0.05c  0.00C  0.01C  0.29c  0.05C  0.05c  0.00
No. locations < > 0 (statis.)  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
Storage time from harvest (wks/yr)  12.9  10.4  13.2  11.6  17.6  17.2  11.9  17.1
Notes: "Harvest Early" simulation scenario denotes marketing year initiation at 20% harvest completion; "Harvest Late"
denotes marketing year initiation at 80% harvest completion; "Late Model Start" denotes eight weeks after mid-harvest.
"%  reduce is: 100(1 - hedged/unhedged),  for variance of 13 annual model prices (> 0 implies hedging reduces risk).
b  Probability of drawing at least the observed number  of positive advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
"Probability of drawing at most the observed number  of positive  advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
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Table 4. Advantage of Storage Model over Representative Kansas Marketer, Risk
Advantage for Hedged over Unhedged Storage, and Weeks Stored: Various Simu-
lations, Corn and Milo,  1985-97
SIMULATION SCENARIO
Late  Farm  Farm
Simulation Parameter or  Base  Different  Harvest  Harvest  Model  Low  Store  Store
Output Information  Run  Basis  Early  Late  Start  Interest  #1  #2
Harvest time  mid  mid  early  late  mid  mid  mid  mid
Weeks after harvest model starts  0  0  0  0  8  0  0  0
Basis  3-yr.  3-yr. &  cur.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.  3-yr.
Interest rate  bank  bank  bank  bank  bank  CCC  bank  bank
Variable storage rate (¢/bu/mo)  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  1.1  1.1
Fixed storage rate (¢/bu)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.0  -9.0
CORN (11 locations)
Unhedged model advantage (¢/bu/yr)  -17.4  -11.0  -12.9  -18.2  -20.4  -17.7  -9.0  -14.4
No. locations > 0  0  2  3  0  0  1  2  1
p-value (> 0 count)  0.00  0.03
c 0.11C  0.00C  0.00C  0.00C  0.03
c 0.00
No. locations < > 0 (statis.)  4  2  2  5  5  3  0  0
Hedged model advantage (¢/bu/yr)  -13.2  -5.4  -7.8  -11.2  -15.7  -13.5  -9.9  -13.9
No. locations > 0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
p-value (> 0 count)  0.00  0.000  0.00
c .0  0.00  0  0.000 0.00  O  0.00"
No. locations < > 0 (statis.)  4  2  0  1  4  6  1  5
Hedged risk advantage (%  reduce)
a 20.2  14.1  4.3  22.9  19.0  26.6  26.6  29.0
No. locations  > 0  8  7  5  10  10  10  11  11
p-value (> 0 count)  0.11b  0.27b  0.50c  0.00b  O. 0 0 b  0. 0 0b  0 . 0 0 b  O. 0 0b
No. locations  <>  0 (statis.)  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
Storage time from harvest (wks/yr)  33.4  22.1  29.4  34.6  39.4  38.8  35.7  42.4
MILO (17 locations)
Unhedged  model advantage  (¢/bu/yr)  -19.7  -8.8  -18.5  -19.2  -20.9  -19.1  -17.0  -16.2
No. locations  >  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1
p-value (> 0 count)  0.00"  0.00  0.00  0.00C  0.00C  0.00C  0.00C  0.00C
No. locations  < > 0 (statis.)  8  0  8  8  8  9  6  8
Hedged model advantage (¢/bu/yr)  -7.4  2.9  -10.4  -9.5  -10.2  -6.4  -6.9  -7.5
No. locations >  0  3  16  0  2  0  1  0  0
p-value (> 0 count)  0.01
c
0. 0 0 b  0.00C  0.00C  0.00C  0.000  0.00c  0.00C
No. locations <  > 0 (statis.)  1  0  4  3  6  0  0  3
Hedged risk advantage (%  reduce)a  23.3  28.0  21.4  19.7  8.7  19.6  9.4  12.2
No. locations > 0  16  16  14  15  12  15  13  12
p-value (> 0 count)  O. 00b  O. 0 0b  0.00b  0. 0 0b  0.07b  0. 0 0 b  0.02b  0.07b
No. locations < >  0 (statis.)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Storage time from harvest (wks/yr)  30.1  14.2  28.9  28.9  35.2  33.5  37.1  39.0
Notes: "Harvest Early" simulation scenario denotes marketing year initiation at 20% harvest completion;  "Harvest Late"
denotes marketing year initiation at 80% harvest completion; "Late Model Start" denotes eight weeks after mid-harvest.
"%  reduce is: 100(1 - hedged/unhedged),  for variance of 13 annual model prices (> 0 implies hedging reduces risk).
bProbability of drawing at least the observed number of positive advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
Probability of drawing at most the observed number  of positive  advantage values in a random binomial experiment.
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larger for  soybeans  (compare "Harvest Early"  column to "Base Run"  column).  With
soybeans (table 3), the average increase in risk due to hedging appeared much greater
with early harvest compared to mid-harvest (hedged risk advantage went from -34%
to -62%). Still, for early harvest, only one soybean location had a statistically significant
change in risk due to hedging.
Starting the model late ("Late Model Start" column, denoting eight weeks after mid-
harvest) resulted in a reduced unhedged model advantage for wheat (-0.6¢  compared
with 11¢  in the base run). Now, only nine locations (compared to 23 in the base run) had
positive unhedged model advantages  in wheat. Generally,  across all crops (except for
hedged model advantage in soybeans), both unhedged and hedged model advantages
diminished when the storage model was started eight weeks after harvest.
Among the various simulations,  "Low Interest" (CCC rates) appeared to induce the
smallest changes relative to the base run in terms of model profitability or risk advan-
tages-across  all four crops. Not surprisingly,  the lower interest rates  did stimulate
increased storage time across all crops.
The two on-farm storage rates (Farm Store #1  and Farm Store #2) did not appear to
induce large changes relative to the base run in terms of profitability and risk. Farm
Store #2, with a - 9  fixed cost, had hedged model advantages within 1.5¢  of the base
run for corn, milo, and soybeans, and within 4¢  for wheat. This was in spite of the fact
that storage time tended to be substantially greater.
All in all, the simulation results in tables 3 and 4 were highly variable. For example,
the temptation to recommend using either the unhedged or hedged storage model as a
wheat marketing strategy quickly dissipates when viewing the results from starting the
model eight weeks after harvest. This is discouraging because there is little reason a
basis-based storage signaling process should suddenly break down at a different model
starting date. Similarly, a recommendation to use the storage model for soybean mar-
keting appears to break down when grain storers simultaneously turn into hedgers.
Even a temptation to discredit the storage model in milo tends to dissipate when current
basis is used in basis projections, and coupled with hedging. Likely, what is needed in
order to make reliable inferences, is many more years of data.
Consistent with futures efficiency, there was no clear advantage or disadvantage to
hedging across the 32 storage model simulations (eight for each of four crops) in terms
of profitability.  That is,  17 of 32  showed that storage  model  profits increased  with
hedging over not hedging, and 15  showed that profits decreased. In terms of risk, the
results are somewhat more favorable for hedging, as risk fell with hedging in 20 of 32
simulations (the probability of at least 20 out of 32 is 0.11). As Zulauf and Irwin point
out, hedged storage  should reduce risk-cash and futures prices tend to move in the
same direction; thus, unhedged storage returns and short futures returns tend to move
oppositely.
Interestingly, perhaps the most prevailing,  yet seemingly anomalous, result across
the 32 storage simulations is a perverse risk/reward relationship. In all but three sim-
ulations (Late Model Start and Low Interest for wheat, and Farm Store #1 for corn),
whenever hedging reduced profits over not hedging, it increased risk,  and whenever
hedging increased profits, it reduced risk. This seeming anomaly is not hard to explain.
For example, hedged storage was more profitable than unhedged storage in situations
when storage period futures prices fell. As previously noted, because cash and futures
prices move in the same direction, unhedged storage returns and short futures returns
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move oppositely. Thus, where hedging pays, it also mitigates unhedged storage losses,
thereby reducing risk. Of course, with efficient futures, it is impossible to know which
periods might be associated with profitable hedges. Consequently, it is probably mean-
ingless to discuss such conditional risk/reward tradeoffs.
Conclusions
Relevance  is  always  an issue  in marketing  studies.  The  less  aggregated,  the  more
comprehensive,  and the  simpler the  underlying  empirical  process,  the  more  likely
results will be believed  and  the methods  incorporated  into  producers' management
decisions. This project sought to develop simple, post-harvest grain marketing strategies
that depend only on futures price, historical localized basis, and producer-level storage
costs, and which crucially assume futures efficiency.  Cash price data from 23 Kansas
locations  were used in a grain storage  decision  simulation  to test whether Kansas
wheat, corn, milo, and soybean producers could have used deferred futures plus histor-
ical basis cash price expectations  to profitably guide unhedged or hedged post-harvest
grain storage decisions over the 13 harvests from  1985-97.
On average, a producer who had used deferred futures with three-year historical basis
and commercial storage rates to signal unhedged grain storage decisions would have
improved profits by 11¢ per bushel per year for wheat and 27.1¢ for soybeans, but would
have reduced profits by 17.4¢ and 19.7¢ for corn and milo, respectively, over the typical
Kansas producer. Adding short futures hedges to signal-based  grain storage  changed
conclusions, especially for soybeans, where average profits fell from 27.1¢ to 2.1¢. These
inconsistencies  across crops and across hedging versus not hedging demand additional
crop-specific information or additional years of data before they instill much confidence.
Also, benefits to using the signal-based grain storage procedure were highly variable
across cash locations, which suggests that economists  should be careful when making
grain storage strategy recommendations to individual producers. Furthermore, for some
crops  and years, the decision  model would  have  stored grain for more than a year,
obviously necessitating adequate  equity or debt financing  on the part of the  model
follower.
If inferences are confined to random rather than specific Kansas cash price locations,
then the grain storage decision model was generally not sensitive to alternative interest
rates or storage costs. It was sensitive to, but not clearly systematically related to, basis
specification, harvest start date of the model, and whether the storage-signaling process
was allowed to begin at harvest or not until eight weeks after harvest. Across all simu-
lations  considered,  and consistent with futures efficiency,  hedging did not typically
change profitability. Hedging did, however, tend to reduce risk.
This  analysis  considered  many  scenarios  across  different  crops,  locations,  and
alternative  specifications  for futures-plus-basis  post-harvest grain storage  signaling
models. What appeared to be a reliable finding based on statistical significance in one
scenario  was  often reversed  in another.  Thus,  based  on  this research,  it would  be
inappropriate  to suggest that post-harvest  grain  storage decisions  should  generally
be based on projected returns to storage calculated from deferred futures plus histor-
ical  basis.  Consequently, based  on  this investigation,  it would  be inappropriate  to
reject cash market efficiency. Along with the wide data set used here, a longer data set
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would be helpful in making reliable inferences from studies such as these. Regardless,
combining  statistical  significance  and  economic  theory into  meaningful  generaliza-
tions about marketing strategies will always  be difficult and should always proceed
cautiously.
[Received June 1998; final revision received  June 1999.]
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